The Culture Industry in the Age of the Internet

Adorno and Horkheimer’s ideas on the culture industry arguably redefined our understanding of media and communications, aiming to show how the culture industry standardise and mass-produce products to engineer society into passivity and discourage opposition to the status quo (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944). Although many of these ideas that we will explore are immensely applicable in the contemporary cultural landscape, as we shall see, there are other aspects of the modern cultural landscape within the digital age which challenge some of the preconceptions of the culture industry that have only become apparent since the advent of social media (Spier 2016). Adorno stated in a later paper that “the culture industry intentionally integrates its consumers from above” (Adorno and Rabinbach 1975, pp. 12), but in the modern digital landscape where the line between consumers and producers has blurred (Manovich 2009, pp. 320), how effectively anti-establishment sentiment is able to arise and subvert the standardised moulds of the culture industry is important to review.

One of the key ideas that Adorno and Horkheimer (1944) present within their work is the commodification of culture and how content is produced not primarily for any artistic pursuit but to maximise profit margins (Baugh 1990a, pp. 66). Moreover, to do this content producers will appeal to the broadest possible demographics and audiences by standardising culture and “infecting everything with sameness” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944, pp. 109). Many would argue that these ideas are immensely prevalent in today's cultural landscape, and we can look to the gaming industry, which as Borowiecki and Prieto-Rodriguez (2015, pp. 239) point out, has received little attention despite its economic importance, as a case study to prove this. Originally, companies would attempt to garner and capitalise on a reputation for creating compelling games by using the medium’s ever-changing technology to push the boundaries of the art form (Berg Marklund et al. 2019, 186) and thus, vast amounts of people would buy their future titles knowing that they would be purchasing a product that was of the highest possible quality (Katre 1992). Companies such as Nintendo and Rockstar still use this strategy today, however it requires years of built-up goodwill amoung consumers, as well as vast amounts of time, money and talent to produce a boundary pushing piece of art consistently enough to be profitable (Yufa et al. 2019, pp. 63). 

Thus today, most companies have instead chosen to adopt an alternative strategy which includes; faster turnout times, producing primarily sequels and standardising their games by borrowing assets from their older titles, appealing to people's love for familiarity rather than creativity (Marklund et al. 2019, pp. 192-193). These development techniques, along with predatory practices such as in-app purchases and microtransactions, have been immensely effective at maximising profit margins, with EA reportedly making $1.6 billion in 2020 from their FIFA Ultimate Team mode alone (McAloon 2021). Therefore, Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1944, pp. 109) ideas on standardisation and “sameness” are immensely applicable in today's contemporary gaming landscape, where modern practices are making most high budget games less unique as an art form and standardising them to extract as much money from their consumers, rather than striving to produce the best possible art (Babe 2012, pp. 103).

Furthermore, Adorno and Horkheimer (1944, 96) argue that the culture industry is used to control the masses (Waldman 1977, pp. 57) and manipulate society into passivity. In many ways this is arguably just as applicable today, as through the standardised cultural products being produced, be it within the gaming industry discussed, or the similar television, book and film industries, they all promote conformity to said standardised conventions whilst discouraging the novel or subversive (Gunster 2000, pp. 42). However, that is not to say that the culture industry shies away from including themes of subversiveness and anti-establishment sentiment within its contents (Wang 2023), but that these are concepts only to be discussed within the boundaries of the established system. For example, many mainstream films in the contemporary cultural landscape centre around themes of revolution and overthrow (Wang 2023, pp. 1008), be it V for Vendetta or The Hunger Games. They include these themes arguably striving to create a catharsis when interacting with said media that would act as an adequate substitute for any actual action against the real institutions that these fantasies caricature. 

The same argument holds true for what has become known as online slacktivism, where people's social media engagement often provides an adequate enough sense of contribution to movements they might otherwise be inspired to enact real political or social change within (Kristofferson et al. 2014). Thus here, Adorno and Horkheimer’s ideas around the culture industry’s goal of passivity remain immensely applicable in our modern media landscape, as consumers can express these emotions of frustration and resistance to the established orders, thus pacifying them so that few consumers actually attempt anything truly revolutionary to change said systems.

However, one factor of the contemporary culture industry which is less reflected in Adorno and Horkheimer’s ideas is how social media algorithms aim to both create the same subconscious passivity discussed, while at the same time inflame real impassioned engagement from its consumers (Fuchs 2018, pp. 84). Social media algorithms modify an individual's feed to promote those holding similar political, social and cultural values to constantly appear whilst suppressing alternative points of view, thus reinforcing their own biases and creating a false sense of unilateral factuality on immensely partisan issues (Khosravinik 2017, pp. 53). This echo chamber (Kahne and Middaugh 2012, pp. 55) then creates a cycle of inflamed discourse between the resulting factions whenever their ideas cross-contaminate with other isolated bubbles (Fuchs 2018, pp. 87). Thus, one could argue that the algorithms of our social media apps promote polarisation and division as a byproduct of trying to cater to a consumer’s specific tastes, to more effectively market advertisements and keep engagement high (Manovich 2009, 321). 

Therefore, as Adorno and Horkheimer often discuss how the culture industry aims to perpetuate the status quo (1944, pp. 95), one could very easily argue that the status quo in modern political discourse has now become polarisation and division (Fuchs 2018, pp. 84) because of these polarised echo chambers. Thus, their ideas around the culture industry solely creating passivity within consumers may not be as applicable in isolation, when factoring in the conscious inflammation of extreme emotive action which social media clearly aims to foster.

Similar to how the contemporary culture industry often uses themes of anti-establishment sentiment within its popular media, Adorno and Horkheimer (1944, pp. 96) also discuss how they believe the culture industry incorporates real anti-establishment movements to then capitalise on their popularity as a trend to market adjacent products, making consumption a part of identity (1944, pp. 123). If we look to more contemporary movements inspired by social media, the cottagecore subculture is an interesting example to dissect, as it shares many traits to those subcultures discussed by influential cultural studies scholars like Stuart Hall (Clark et al. 1991), who see subcultures often as a form of resistance to the dominant culture. Cottagecore was originally an online subculture largely created by young women, to appeal to those who idealised rural life and simplistic nature-adjacent living (Tileva 2020) and wished to break away from the trappings of modern corporate capitalism (Strinati 2004, 55). However, as it grew in popularity, the subculture morphed and diluted into a more simplistic aesthetic which people attempted to attain through purchases of fast-fashion clothing from corporate giants such as SHEIN or Amazon (Brand 2021). 

Therefore, much like as Adorno and Horkheimer (1979, pp. 142) argue, the cottagecore subculture’s attempt to “escape from everyday drudgery” of the culture industry led many straight back into the system they claimed to reject (Brand 2021, pp. 16). However, although it is true that many anti-establishment movements are incorporated and tailored to by the culture industry, the very existence of these niche digital subcultures could be seen as another aspect of the modern culture industry where Adorno and Horkheimer’s ideas are not as applicable today. Specifically, their ideas regarding cultural homogenisation and conformity have been somewhat shaken by the digital age (Klinenberg and Benzecry 2005, pp. 15), where people can now foster niche communities online which simply were not possible during their time. Nevertheless, their ideas surrounding the incorporation of anti-establishment movements are still immensely applicable, as these new sub-cultures and communities can often be seen as more illusions of movements rather than anything more (Brand 2021), with the incorporation and commodification of anti-establishment movements helping to create false needs that can only be satisfied by the products of capitalism (Adorno and Rabinbach 1975, pp. 14).

To conclude, as has been shown throughout this essay, many of Adorno and Horkheimer’s ideas discussed are immensely applicable in the contemporary cultural landscape. Be it their ideas of standardisation of culture, prevalent in today’s entertainment media such as the gaming industry, which largely attempts to maximise profit at the cost of innovative art (Yufa et al. 2019), or their ideas on anti-establishment sentiment, which is both used within media to pacify its consumers, as well as incorporated into the culture industry to market to subcultures and movements whenever they arise (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979, pp. 142). However, it appears that unprecedented aspects of the digital age, which Adorno and Horkheimer could not have predicted in their own time, have managed to challenge some of their arguments (Klinenberg and Benzecry 2005, pp. 15), as social media algorithms often attempt to inflame passion rather than passivity, and have the ability to foster large amounts of subcultures, which often attempt to break away from the standardised moulds of culture. However, these few discrepancies are arguably still arising within the constraints of the wider culture industry, as through the echo chambers of social media people are passively exposed to targeted marketing and these newly founded subcultures often become aesthetic illusions that facilitate consumption as part of their identity.

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