Is Globalisation a (Necessary) Myth?

Introduction:

Before we can answer the questions of whether globalisation is a myth and whether said myth can be considered ‘necessary’, we must first explore what is meant by globalisation in the first place. Despite the vast and expanding scholarly work on the subject, there is yet to be a ‘cogent theory’ (Held et al. 1999, pp. 2) of globalisation and thus, the term is often used to cover a multitude of differing concepts surrounding global interconnectedness. Latif agrees, stating that the term globalisation ‘lacks a precise definition’ (2010, pp. 33). Moreover, Edwards and Wajcman go as far as to say that globalisation is not a ‘single process’ (2005, pp. 235) and that instead it refers to a series of modern societal evolutions.

With all this in mind, the scholarly consensus surrounding the ambiguity of the term leads to questions around how tangible such an elusive concept really is, or whether the idea of globalisation is in reality a myth. Latif summarises such debates (2010), stating that there are three broad perspectives on the topic, that being the hyperglobalizers, who believe modern society has become thoroughly globalised (pp. 34), the skeptics, who deny the existence of such a concept (pp. 38) and lastly, the transformationalists, who sit somewhere in between (pp, 43).

Within this essay, I will argue that globalisation, in its common understanding as an ever connected and homogenised world, is a myth within contemporary society. This is not to say however, that the concept is wholly false, but that it is a myth that ‘fuses truth with falsehoods’ (Skinner 2007, pp. 1). Moreover, because of the overarching economic impact of said myth, it has been used to justify the continuation of regional and class inequalities and allow hegemonic powers to dominate over other nations (Gamage 2015, pp. 8).

To best outline the reasons behind such an evaluation, it is necessary that a term as multifaceted as this should first be broken down into categories, because as globalisation is driven by interconnected factors (Ampuja 2012, pp. 18), it deserves analysis of its main aspects independently, without broad generalisations which are supposedly applicable to all of them. Therefore, similar to how Fuchs categorised the term (2020, pp. 267), this essay will explore the cultural, political and economic aspects of globalisation, whilst also including technological globalisation as well. Through each, this essay will determine how globalisation has been mythologised in modern culture and how these aspects of the myth can be considered unnecessary, as they have led to the concentration of wealth and power into the hands of dominant nations, big corporations and high-net-worth individuals (Schuerkens 2010, pp. 8; Pfeffer and Schoeni 2016, pp. 14). Thus, it is important to note that all factors of globalisation discussed within this essay are primarily influenced and affected by one key factor, namely, economic inequality (Hirst and Thompsom 2003, pp. 98).

Cultural Globalisation:

The idea of cultural globalisation covers the process by which regional cultures have become increasingly intertwined and influenced by one another, spurred on by the ease of modern transport and the rise of the digital age (Hassan 2020, pp. 141). It is undoubtedly true that because of these realities of the modern world, certain regional customs and cultural norms have been influenced by other such cultures which, in previous times, would have been hindered by geographical restrictions (Ambirajan 2000, pp. 2143). This can be seen not only in the media, such as in the impact of Hollywood on global perceptions of film (Crane 2013), but also in aspects of daily life, such as food and diet (Nuetzenadel and Trentmann 2008).

However, the assertion that this cross-cultural homogenisation has become more prevalent than regional diversity is a fallacy, as cultural differences or ‘heterogenisation’ (Rantanen 2005, pp. 99) between nations play a larger role in modern society than some may claim (Latif 2010, pp. 42). An example of this can be seen in differing global work cultures. The prevalence of the Japanese concept of karoshi, meaning death from overwork, highlights the intense expectations on Japanese workers (Kawanishi 2008, pp. 61), when compared to Denmark’s emphasis on work-life balance, where employees can expect to leave work around 4pm and enjoy extensive paid leave and benefit schemes (Hvid and Falkum 2019).

Since it is therefore hard to argue that the prevalence of cultural homogenisation has usurped regional diversity of culture, it is important to evaluate whether the necessary benefits of such a myth disseminating throughout modern discourse outweigh any potential drawbacks. From one perspective, having the idea of a more interconnected global culture could aid in conflict resolution and tackling the pressing existential crises of modern life, be it global pandemics, economic inequality or the climate crisis (Skinner 2007, pp. 169). Such a unifying global phenomenon could act as a cultural lingua franca, creating a dialogue between regions, free from prior prejudices and misinterpretations from unique diplomatic practices, which have historically contributed to the disruption of a global consensus when tackling universal issues (Richmond 2004, pp. 129).

However, this idealised viewpoint makes the assumption that cultural globalisation has no centre of influence, with a cross-pollination of culture being contributed to equally, by all regions around the globe. Alternatively, it can be argued that cultural globalisation is not a necessary myth, as some scholars such as Rantanen (2005, pp. 2) and Fuchs (2020, pp. 259) argue that cultural globalisation is not ubiquitous and thus, has led to a homogenisation where nations have largely assimilated to and under the dominant culture, due to its political and economic supremacy. Therefore, the term cultural globalisation can often be seen in practise as a pseudonym for cultural imperialism (Fuchs 2020, pp. 287), as the efficacy of a region’s successful cross-cultural exchange is largely down to said nation's cultural and political hegemony.

However, such cultural imperialism needs to be shrouded behind local traditions if it is to effectively produce domineering influence with lasting control. This can be seen in the USA’s dominant worldwide cultural outreach over the 20th and 21st century, where it has used its status as an international superpower to acclimatise other nations into accepting US customs and traditions, so it may profit economically from global markets (Skinner 2007, pp. 2). International fast-food brands like McDonald’s for example, provide the same familiar US items globally, whilst also tailoring their menus to the tastes of each demographic region, to maximise profit within said location (Ritzer 1998).

This modern example of a dominant cultural power tailoring its approach to assimilation according to a specific region's needs, arguably shares similarities to methods adopted by the Roman Empire to acclimatise other regions into accepting their cultural hegemony (Gardner 2013, pp. 1). The Romans would similarly tailor their approach to each region they conquered, even continuing to allow the worship of local gods alongside their own pantheon, so that they could profit from the region with as little resistance as possible (Gruen 2022, pp. 171). Thus, this covert tactic of cultural imperialism has been a consistent trend across time and led to the economic dominance of some nations over others (Gamage 2015, pp. 13). Therefore, I would argue that cultural globalisation can be considered unnecessary within modern society, as it often acts as a smokescreen for exploitation by dominant political powers exerting their influence on less powerful regions (Gamage 2015, pp. 8).

Political Globalisation:

With the rise of politically globalised institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and European Union, there has been a significant rise in international cooperation within the 20th and 21st centuries (Latif 2010, pp. 35) and there are some potential benefits to this. For example, increased international political consensus should, in theory, aid in tackling existential threats, such as the climate crisis, which will negatively impact all regions and nations (Skinner 2007, pp. 169).

However, in reality the failure of said institutions to have a consistent and radical impact on global climate action (Zayim 2019), highlights how a politically globalised world is in reality a myth. The yearly COP (Conference of Parties) demonstrates this in action, as tensions between developed and developing nations regarding their economic responsibilities have led to insufficient progress on emissions reduction (Derman 2013, pp. 26). Therefore, regional and national interest still appear to take precedence over a global effort for positive change (Skinner 2007, pp. 142). Nations such as the US for example, have continued to prioritise their economy over their environmental impact, through reintroducing environmentally harmful practices like fracking since Trump’s re-election in 2024 (BBC News 2025).

Thus, the myth of political globalisation is far from necessary today, because of the ineffectiveness of contemporary global institutions in tackling their objectives and swaying national governments from looking past self-interest (Zayim 2019, pp. 11). Moreover, the unproductive nature of said institutions arguably provides much of the public with a false sense of security over the handling of existential threats, causing citizens to falsely believe that there are suitably effective measures in place to tackle global issues (Schuerkens 2010, pp. 9). This security can lead to complacency, which may impede any real positive change or reform from taking place. Thus, the myth of political globalisation arguably needs to make way until such a time when real political consensus has made a truly effective positive impact on a global scale and will remain unnecessary until this is achieved.

Economic Globalisation:

Scholars such as Hirst and Thompson argue that economic globalisation is a myth, as modern trends reinforce the idea that the ‘world economy has internationalised in its basic dynamics (2003, pp. 98), with this often wrongly being conflated as a new form of globalisation. Alternatively, they saw modern changes towards ‘greater international trade and investment’ that lived within the existing set of economic relations, rather than anything new (pp. 98-99). Despite their observations however, the myth of an economically globalised world has spread alongside the rapid advancement of digital technology, where new dominant online markets have emerged and usurped traditional regional ones (Skinner 2007, pp. 102).

Therefore, the reason the myth of economic globalisation is not only unnecessary but has also become a driving factor in many contemporary crises, is because of the precedent it has set for the business practices of high-net-worth individuals and mega corporations (Gamage 2015, pp. 14). The idea that we are an interconnected world where capitalist markets are now viewed on a global rather than regional scale, has led to billionaires and monopolising tech companies using this to their advantage to increase their wealth exponentially, whilst draining regional economies (Dean and McLean 2022, pp. 32). This can be seen in tactics such as profit shifting, where multinational companies moved an estimated $950 billion of profits from one country to another in 2016 to reduce their overall tax liability (EU Tax Observatory 2021), and the use of tax havens, such as Dubai and Monaco, where wealthy individuals can use modern global mobility to avoid paying tax (Cobham and Janský 2017). This has allowed the richest in society to accrue immense amounts of wealth from the markets of their country of origin, whilst also avoiding taxation that would have previously gone back into that country's economy (Pfeffer and Schoeni 2016, pp. 9-10).

This has been a key factor in the cost-of-living crisis and collapse of the middle class in western nations (Webster and Neal 2022), which has arisen since the financial crash of 2008 and been exacerbated by COVID-19. The economic fallout of the lockdown restrictions is in fact a great case study for how economic globalisation has led to increased wealth inequality (Stantcheva 2022). During this time, local economies were heavily restricted and weakened, whilst tech giants, such as those dubbed ‘the Magnificent Seven’ in the US (Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Meta, Nvidia, and Tesla), accrued a combined revenue of over $2 trillion between the years 2020 to 2024 (Visual Capitalist 2024), as they benefited on the world’s reliance on globalised digital technology. Therefore, the myth of economic globalisation is far from necessary, as it has given rise to international monopolies which have led to exponential wealth inequality world-wide and a growing divide between the richest and poorest (Dean and McLean 2022, pp. 32).

Technological Globalisation:

The widespread global dissemination and integration of digital technology has led to many debates surrounding its impact on international connectedness (Wolff 2021, pp. 1). There are many supposed advantages to an ever-connected technological world, such as broader access to knowledge and education (Das 2009, pp. 54). For example, because of the impact of websites like Wikipedia, knowledge which was once reserved for those attending academic education, has become far more democratised, both in its production as well as its consumption (Skinner 2007, pp. 114). Moreover, the internet and social media have undoubtedly created new tools for near instant communication worldwide, which has the capacity to strengthen cultural and informational exchange and enable collaboration between connected nations.

However, much like cultural globalisation, the idea that these advantages are ubiquitous and equivalent across the globe is a myth, which is largely Western-centric in nature (Skinner 2007, pp. 105-6). Disparities in internet access can be found in regions like China, where the government’s ‘Great Firewall’ controls the populace’s access to certain websites and content (Tai 2014, pp. 64), as well as in developing regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, where statistics show that only 25% of the population had mobile internet connectivity in 2022 (GSMA 2024). This reality is far from the fully connected world which modern conceptions of globalisation often suggest.

Therefore, I would argue that like cultural globalisation, technological globalisation can also act as a smokescreen for a far less democratic phenomenon, in this case digital colonialism (Salami 2024, pp. e67-2). This is because, for example, US companies such as Meta have attempted to capitalise on the lack of digital infrastructure in developing nations, such as Ghana and Kenya, to monopolise this emerging market through their Free Basics initiative, acquiring vast amounts of user data, which in the modern economy, has become a valuable asset (The Guardian 2017).

What we see in reality therefore, is much closer to a global technocratic oligarchy, where technological development is controlled by a small number of mainly US-based companies, who monopolise the contemporary market and have been enabled to grow in wealth and power exponentially by neoliberal Western governments (Dean and McLean 2022, pp. 32). Thus, capitalistic production has become intrinsically tied to technological globalisation (Fuchs 2020, pp. 287) and therefore, not only is a uniform technologically globalised world a myth, but said myth is unnecessary as it aids in masking the growing levels of technological inequality within the modern age.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, as has been seen throughout this essay, all aspects of globalisation have potential advantages that may qualify them as ‘necessary’ in the eyes of some. However, I believe that the ways in which the myth of globalisation has been manipulated by hegemonic powers and multinational corporations to further increase their power and wealth, has had drastic and problematic ramifications on the contemporary global landscape.

Firstly, a homogenised global culture that is consistent across the globe has not yet replaced cultural diversity, as there are still countless examples of heterogenous social norms and traditions present in modern life (Rantanen 2005, pp. 99). Alternatively, we have seen the rise of cultural imperialism worldwide, as politically and economically hegemonic nations such as the US, have used their wealth to spread their cultural norms internationally through media and industry. This has allowed them to profit from other regions and further build their global dominance, by solidifying their cultural norms as the global status quo (Gamage 2015, pp. 8).

Moreover, globalised political institutions such as the UN and COP conferences, may promise a multinational effort to tackle the universal existential crises we face, but have nonetheless been ineffective at tackling said crises, because of the economic and political interests of individual nations superseding the collective effort (Skinner 2007, pp. 142). Furthermore, the myth of an economically globalised world has led to a drastic increase in wealth inequality, as the 1% and tech companies have used the ever-connected nature of contemporary life to grow their wealth, whilst avoiding their obligations to regional economies and governments (Dean and McLean 2022, pp. 32). They have been enabled to do this, largely aided by the myth of a technologically globalised world, which may be true for most developed nations, but which has also allowed for digital colonialism in developing nations, where large tech companies have monopolised local markets, building up their own economies whilst controlling the technological development of others (Salami 2024, pp. e67-2).

With all this in mind, the myth of globalisation can be considered ‘unnecessary’ until such a time when these cultural, political, economic and technological imbalances have been adequately rectified.

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